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IMPROVING HIGHER EDUCATION REGULATION
Wendell Pritchett†
Last fall, the U.S. Department of Education released an updated
“College Scorecard,” an online system providing a voluminous amount of
data on the nation’s colleges and universities. 1 The scorecard is the
outcome of a three-year effort, announced by President Obama to much
fanfare during the 2012 campaign, to create a “college rating system” that
would assess the nation’s higher education institutions on their cost of
attendance, student graduation rates, and graduates’ post-college earnings.2
It would also determine the allocation of federal funding to those
institutions.
After three years of withering attack from college leaders across the
nation, the Obama Administration backed off and announced last summer
that, in addition to updating the scorecard, it would focus its efforts on
methods to promote “innovation” within the higher education sector. 3
Although the rating system has failed to take root (at least for now), the
debate that it instigated over the appropriate methods for the federal
government to regulate higher education was instructive about the challenges
legislators face as they continue to discuss the (already two years late)
reauthorization of the Higher Education Act.
It is not surprising that higher education leaders are opposed to greater
federal regulation. As chronicled in a major report released last summer by
the Task Force on the Regulation of Higher Education, the sector also has
valid complaints about the inappropriately burdensome nature of many
†
James S. Riepe Presidential Professor of Law and Education at the University of
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1
Fact Sheet: Empowering Students to Choose the College that is Right for Them, THE
WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 12, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/12/
fact-sheet-empowering-students-choose-college-right-them.
2
Megan Slack, President Obama Explains His Plan to Combat Rising College Costs,
THE WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 22, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/08/22/
president-obama-explains-his-plan-combat-rising-college-costs.
3
Doug Lederman et. al., Rating (and Berating) the Ratings, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb.
7, 2014), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/02/07/colleges-and-analysts-respondobama-ratings-proposal; Helping Families Navigate Their Higher Education Options,
DEPT. EDUC. (June 25, 2015), https://www.ed.gov/content/helping-families-navigatetheir-higher-education-options.
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current federal regulations.4 However, the dramatic increase in federal
student support (some $160 billion in FY 15) over the past decade, combined
with growing concerns about the productivity of the higher education
sector, make it likely that demands for greater accountability from the
industry about outcomes, and particularly student outcomes, will continue.
So, what is the way forward? Reformers of the system of higher education
seek feasible and effective ways to use law and regulation to improve the
access to and quality of higher education in America. They want to know how
the Higher Education Act should be amended. They want the right approach.
The debate over the Obama Administration’s college rating proposal
probably reveals more than just that the right approach cannot lie with
general performance-based ratings. It may be that the right approach is to
take several approaches.
To succeed in improving higher education demands that we start with
first principles. Higher education is, after all, only one of many sectors the
government regulates. Looking at the debate over higher education reform
from the vantage point of the regulation in general, and in light of the main
types of regulation, can help us to understand better how higher education
could be more productively overseen. Such an analysis also suggests some
potential compromises that could promote greater productivity from the
higher education sector while at the same time reducing some of its
regulatory burdens.
In this series of essays, I identify a path forward that both Democrats
and Republicans can, and are starting to, recognize. Success on this path
will not depend on the implementation of an overarching system of college
ratings, or any other single fix. Rather, it will call for wisely selecting and
tailoring an appropriate mix of different regulatory tools.
I. TYPES OF REGULATION
To understand the challenges with the current regulatory structure of
higher education, as well as the challenges of reforming that structure, it
helps to understand the potential and limitations of the different approaches
to regulation more generally.
As my colleague Cary Coglianese has written, the government has many
different regulatory tools in its belt, and it regulates different industries in
different ways.5 Three main approaches to regulation are “command and
control,” performance-based, and management-based. Each approach has
strengths and weaknesses. Selecting the type of regulation to apply to a
sector of the economy will have major impacts on the targeted institutions
and on the potential for success in achieving regulatory goals.
4
AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC., RECALIBRATING REGULATION OF COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL REGULATION OF HIGHER
EDUCATION (2015), https://www.acenet.edu/Documents/Higher-Education-RegulationsTask-Force-Report.pdf.
5
Cary Coglianese, Regulation’s Four Core Components, REGUL. REV. (Sept. 17,
2012), https://www.theregreview.org/2012/09/17/regulations-four-core-components.
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Traditionally, the majority of regulations have taken the form of what is
frequently referred to as command-and-control regulation (also sometimes
called “means-based” or “technology-based”). Under this approach, the
regulatory agency sets forth methods, materials, and the processes by which
the regulated entity must operate. The now dissolved U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission, for example, directed which technology must be used in
approved nuclear power plants and regulated the processes by which
companies produce nuclear power. 6
Command-and-control regulation, in theory, creates certainty—for the
government, the regulated entity, and the public—that a body of experts
have carefully developed the safest and most efficient mode of operation
for the sector. This type of regulation is relatively easy for the regulator to
observe and evaluate, and therefore to determine compliance. However,
many have critiqued command and control as a highly expensive form of
regulation, as one that increases the costs of products to the public, and as
stifling of innovation.7 Critics also question whether regulators have the
ability to develop the most efficient technological or procedural safeguards.8
As critiques of government bureaucracy have increased in recent
decades, support for an alternative to command and control has grown. With
one such alternative, performance-based regulation, the regulator does not
dictate the materials or processes the regulated entity must use to achieve
societal goals, but rather sets ultimate production standards that the entity
must meet. This approach allows the regulated entity the flexibility to
determine the most efficient way to meet that standard. Take, for example,
carbon monoxide emission regulations implemented under the Clean Air
Act, which do not require the use of specific technologies or processes, but
rather leave those choices to the regulated industries and instead mandate
that emissions cannot exceed a set limit. In every administration since at
least the Clinton Administration, performance-based regulation has been
advocated quite explicitly within White House directives to regulators
working in a variety of areas. It is an approach with bipartisan support.
Advocates of performance-based regulation argue that it promotes
innovation and reduces costs by encouraging the regulated entity to figure out
the best way to achieve societal goals.9 The evidence for such claims, however,
is not nearly as powerful as the intuition that flexibility should lower costs.10
Performance-based standards have their own limitations in practice,
including fundamental disagreements over what the goals should be and how
6

Alice Buck, The Atomic Energy Commission, July 1983, http://energy.gov/sites/
prod/files/AEC%20History.pdf.
7
Dwight R. Lee, The High Cost of Command and Control, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC.
(Aug. 1, 2001), http://fee.org/articles/the-high-cost-of-command-and-control.
8
See Marshall J. Breger, Regulatory Flexibility and the Administrative State, 32
TULSA L. REV. 325 (1996).
9
Cary Coglianese, Jennifer Nash & Todd Olmstead, Performance-Based Regulation:
Prospects and Limitations in Health, Safety and Environmental Protection, 55 ADMIN. L.
REV. 705 (2003), at 723.
10
Id. at 707.
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performance standards should be set. Sometimes critics of performancebased regulation question whether government can measure performance
accurately.
Performance standards can have the perverse effect of privileging
certain societal goals over others depending on the shape of the standards.
If not monitored and enforced well, they also can lead to bad behavior by
actors under pressure to produce results. The recent Volkswagen scandal,
where the company rigged its emission systems to enable cars that violated
federal emissions standards to pass the tests, is only the latest example of
this problem.11 Examples even closer to home are the numerous cheating
scandals in the nation’s elementary and secondary schools, brought on by
pressure from federal performance standards.
In addition, when applied to heterogeneous institutions, uniform
performance standards can still operate inefficiently by imposing a onesize-fits-all performance goal. It might not always be cost-effective to have
every institution meet the same standard.
So, even though performance-based regulation continues to have strong
advocates, policymakers rightfully question whether it is the answer in
every case.
A third approach to regulation, called management-based regulation,
has recently received increasing attention. Interest in it seems strongest in
settings where a regulated sector is filled with highly heterogeneous
institutions, and where the goals of regulation are diffuse and hard to
measure.12 In these settings, mandating specific processes or setting hard
and fast performance standards would not be appropriate. However, to
protect society from damage or to produce societal benefits, the government
requires the entity to “self-regulate.”13 The institution does this by engaging
in a meaningful assessment and planning process that determines both the
institution’s goals and the efforts they will undertake to achieve these goals.
Under management-based regulation, the entity sets the standards and
evaluates itself (or through a third, non-governmental party) to determine
whether it has achieved these goals. The benefits of management-based
regulation are that it, theoretically, promotes innovation by enabling
institutions to develop, and therefore buy into, their own standards. It is also
cost effective, as the government does not have to take on the significant
regulatory burden of developing the goals and measuring the sector’s
success in achieving them.
One prominent example of the management-based approach arises in
the area of food safety, where many countries have adopted the Hazards
11

Cary Coglianese, What Volkswagen Reveals about the Limits of Performance-Based
Regulation, REGUL. REV. (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.theregreview.org/2015/10/05/
coglianese-volkswagen-performance-based-regulation.
12
Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Using Private
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 691 (2003), at 720.
13
See Cary Coglianese, Management-Based Regulation: Implications for Public
Policy (OECD, Paper No. GOV/PGC/REG(2008)5, 2008), https://www.oecd.org/gov/
regulatory-policy/41628947.pdf.
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Analysis and Critical Control Points approach that requires food production
companies to self-assess their potential safety hazards and identify
preventive measures that they will adopt to deal with those risks.14 Another
example is Massachusetts’ Uniform Toxic Use Reduction Act, which
requires chemical companies to develop plans to reduce the amount of toxic
substances they release into the environment.15 In both of these cases, the
plans are reviewed and evaluated by a government regulator.
There are, of course, many potential challenges with this managementbased approach. For example, it may be difficult for regulators or private
evaluators to determine whether the goals and processes established by the
institution will actually benefit society. Since the regulatory regime does
not require any specific outcomes, but rather a process to determine
outcomes, institutions could “game the system” and create meaningless
plans that do not benefit the public. Furthermore, institutions could produce
good plans but never implement them.
Good management-based regulation, analysts have argued, must be
shaped by the regulator to ensure that the proper goals are being planned for
and the plans developed can actually be implemented. 16 Although it has
limitations, the small amount of study on this relatively new approach to
regulation has found that sectors imposing management-based regulation
have seen increases in safety and productivity. 17
In recent decades, policymakers have debated frequently what type of
regulation is most appropriate in a given sector of the economy. In many
complex areas, such as higher education, the regulatory scheme involves a
mixture of approaches. Command-and-control regulation still predominates,
but efforts to adopt performance-based regulation continue to grow. At the
same time, there is evidence that more regulatory agencies in the United
States and abroad are considering management-based regulation to deal
with the complexities of modern economic and social systems.
In order to assess how to improve regulation of higher education, it is
essential to consider the strengths and weaknesses of the major policy
options. Educational reformers need to take into account what we already
know about the available regulatory tools.
II. MANAGEMENT-BASED REGULATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION
More than 7,000 institutions of higher education exist in the United States
today.18 The sector is richly diverse, with everything from large public research
14

Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/food
/guidance-regulation-food-and-dietary-supplements/hazard-analysis-critical-control-point-haccp.
15
Mass. Gen. Laws § 21I (1989).
16
Coglianese, supra note 13.
17
See Lori Snyder Bennear, Are Management-Based Regulations Effective? Evidence
from State Pollution Prevention Programs, 26 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 327 (2007).
18
Table 105.50. Number of Educational Institutions by Level and Control of Institution:
Selected Years, 1980-81 through 2011-12, NAT’L CTR FOR EDUC. STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/
programs/digest/d13/tables/dt13_105.50.asp.
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institutions to small religious colleges to for-profit institutions located fully
on the web, and much in between. The structures of higher education vary
widely, as do the purposes of the institutions.
Recognizing this diversity, government has historically taken a
management-based approach to the regulation of higher education, unlike
numerous other fields where command-and-control regulation has
predominated. Although states have sometimes been more prescriptive of
the methods and processes by which institutions (particularly public higher
education institutions) must operate, in general higher education institutions
have been given the flexibility to set their own goals and to determine the
methods by which they will achieve them.
The Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA), the law that created the
current federal system of higher education finance, does not prescribe how
institutions should teach, research, or provide service to the community. 19
However, the HEA states that an institution must be “accredited” for its
students to be eligible for Pell Grants and student loans under federal programs.
Accreditation is a private system under which regional or national
private entities work with individual higher education institutions to review
and critique their operations. The higher education institution provides a
“self-assessment” that the accreditor then uses as a framework for
examining the institution’s successes and challenges.
Accreditation has been around for more than a century. Before World
War II, accreditation was a fully private initiative that provided a process
for institutions to assess themselves, and it also served as a basis upon which
institutions would allow students to transfer from one to another. Since the
1950s, accreditation has taken on a second, somewhat conflicting,
responsibility of assuring the government of institutional quality control.
Private accreditors help the federal government by certifying that institutions
are worthy of participation in higher education financial programs.
Under the current accreditation system, seven regional and seven
national accreditors work with institutions to assess their programs. 20
Numerous “program accreditors” also certify specific academic programs.21
For example, the American Bar Association accredits schools of law.
The initial accreditation process for a new institution is especially
detailed—some would argue overly burdensome—and can take between
five and ten years to complete. After initial accreditation, for most
institutions, re-accreditation happens every ten years, providing an
opportunity for them to update their goals and methods and to work with a
third party to self-evaluate. Supporters argue that the flexibility of the
accreditation system allows it to be responsive to the diversity of higher
education—the numerous different academic programs at different kinds of
19

Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1161aa–1.
Regional Accrediting Organizations 2015-2016, C OUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUC.
ACCREDITATION, https://web.archive.org/web/20160405184946/http://www.chea.org/Directories/
regional.asp.
21
Id.
20
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institutions that serve different kinds of students. A “one-size fits all”
approach to regulation, they argue, would be destined to fail.22
With some meaningful exceptions discussed below, the regulation of
higher education is flexible. Unlike with what sometimes happens with
management-based regulation in other sectors, institutions are not required
to submit their plan to the government regulator, but only to the third party
accreditor. They are also not required to implement their plans, and there
are no penalties if, for example, at reaccreditation the institution has not
implemented the plans it established a decade before. However, if an
accreditor finds that the organization has not met the basic requirements of
financial stability and academic rigor (this happens rarely), the institution is
no longer eligible to participate in federal financial aid programs. For almost
every institution, removal of an accreditation would be a death knell, so they
work hard to ensure that this does not happen.
This “hands-off” approach has brought increasing complaints over the
years. Critics argue that the accreditation system has few teeth—that almost
every institution is re-approved, whether they are doing well or poorly.
Further, critics assert that the system provides no ability to assess levels of
institutional success. The re-accreditation answer is a binary “yes or no,”
which prevents comparison of institutions. As a result, it is difficult for
students (and regulators) to determine which institutions provide a quality
education and which ones should be avoided. The accreditation system, critics
argue, does not push institutions to improve. Since an institution meeting
minimum requirements gets the same access to funds as a high-performing
one, there are not enough incentives to improve educational outcomes.
To enhance the strength of the regulatory system, Congress amended
the HEA in 1992 to require the U.S. Department of Education to approve
accreditors.23 The Education Department must certify that each accrediting
agency has the capacity to assess higher education institutions. The
amended HEA also gave more direction to accreditors, requiring them to
certify that institutions meet “minimum standards” in ten areas, including
student achievement and compliance with Title IV. Since the adoption of
these requirements, Education Department oversight of accreditors has
increased, but many still argue that the system has had little substantive
impact and that the regulations have pushed accreditors to become “box
checkers,” certifying that institutions meet minimum standards in their
operations. The system, they argue, does little to help institutions improve
student academic outcomes.
Over the past decade, policy makers have increasingly questioned the
value of accreditation in the federal financial aid system. A 2006 report by
a commission appointed by then Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings
argued that accreditors needed to push institutions to focus more on student
22

Letter from Molly Corbett Broad, President, Am. Council on Educ., to Sen. Lamar
Alexander, Chairman, Sen. Comm. Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions (Apr. 30, 2015),
https://www.acenet.edu/Documents/Comments-Alexander-Accreditation.pdf.
23
Higher Education Act Amendments of 1992, 20 U.S.C. §§ 101-1561.
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academic outcomes and that the system should be more transparent and
accountable to public concerns. 24
“Accreditation is the primary barrier to innovation in American higher
education,” argued Charles Miller, who chaired the commission. While she
was the Education Secretary, Spellings tried to change department regulations
to require accreditors to measure student learning and other outcomes, but
higher education institutions convinced Congress to prohibit the department
from adding these requirements.25 More recently, former Education Secretary
Arne Duncan called accrediting agencies “the watchdogs that don’t bark,”
and Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) has called the system a “cartel.”26
Critics argue that accreditation serves as a barrier to entry for
innovative new educational approaches. For example, federal regulations
require that student aid be allocated based on the number of “academic
credits” being taken by the student. This system calculates the total number
of credits received using the number of hours the student is expected to
spend in class. This “seat time” approach does not measure actual student
learning, many argue.
New approaches, such as “competency-based” education, would
determine student progress based not on the number of hours in class but on
the achievement of certain skills. But because they do not fit well into
existing federal financial aid regulatory requirements, competency-based
approaches have struggled to achieve accreditation and are therefore have
been less able to compete for students desirous of financial support.
Higher education today is under attack from people across the political
spectrum. American colleges and universities are, according to critics, too
expensive, not focused on student success, not helping students progress
quickly to graduation, and not preparing students for success in the
workplace. Given the significant increase in federal funding and the even
greater increase in family contributions to higher education over the past
decade, and with overall student debt at $1.2 trillion, it is not surprising that
there are increasing demands for greater or different regulation of the sector.
But figuring out how to reform will not be easy.
III. PRESIDENT OBAMA’S COLLEGE RATING PROPOSAL
Critics charge that America’s main approach to regulating higher
education—a management-based accreditation process—has failed to spur
24

A TEST OF LEADERSHIP: CHARTING THE FUTURE OF U.S. HIGHER EDUCATION. A
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION APPOINTED BY SECRETARY OF EDUCATION MARGARET
SPELLINGS (2006) at 4.
25
Doug Lederman, Altering Accreditation—But How?, AM. COUNCIL TRUSTEES &
ALUMNI (Sept. 24, 2007), http://www.goacta.org/news/altering_accreditationbut_how.
26
Toward a New Focus on Outcomes in Higher Education, DEPT. EDUC (July 27,
2015), https://web.archive.org/web/20160413020713/https://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/
toward-new-focus-outcomes-higher-education; Tom LoBianco, Rubio: College ‘Cartels’
Need Busting in New Economy, CNN (July 7, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/07/
politics/rubio-higher-education-overhaul/.

2016

IMPROVING HIGHER EDUCATION REGULATION

9

meaningful improvements in the nation’s colleges and universities. Could a
performance-based approach to higher education regulation be the answer?
The recent fight over the Obama Administration’s proposed college
rating system has made evident the challenges with moving to a
performance-based approach. The performance-based rating system
presented serious practical problems that the Administration was simply
unable to resolve. When the Obama Administration announced last year it
was abandoning its rating system proposal, it essentially conceded that the
higher education sector cannot overall be regulated using performance
standards.
When he first announced his rating proposal in 2013, President
Obama stated that his goal was to create greater transparency and
efficiency in the sector. Higher education funding, he argued, should be
focused on broadening access, increasing affordability, and improving
educational quality. Specifically, he called for reforms to federal higher
education financing that would reward colleges that offer low tuition,
provide “value” (defined as programs that had high graduation rates),
enable graduates to obtain good-paying jobs, and give access to lowincome students.
“What we want to do is rate them on who’s offering the best value so
students and taxpayers get a bigger bang for their buck,” the President
argued in remarks at the State University of New York at Buffalo. “Colleges
that keep their tuition down and are providing high-quality education are
the ones that are going to see their taxpayer funding go up. It’s time to stop
subsidizing schools that are not producing good results.”27
The President’s proposal mirrored performance-based funding
proposals that several states, including Tennessee, Ohio, and Indiana, have
adopted to allocate a small percentage of funding to their public higher
education institutions.28 The basic idea is that schools that meet established
performance goals get greater funding than those that do not.
Although their responses to the President’s proposal differed in tone and
substance, higher education institutions around the country were vocal and
active critics of the proposal, and their critiques mirrored those of
performance-based regulation in general. Higher education leaders argued
that such a rating system would be impossible to create because higher
education is too diverse and has too many goals.29 Critics asked: how can
the “value” of education ever be meaningfully quantified?
“Private, independent college leaders do not believe it is possible to
create a single metric that can successfully compare the broad array of
American higher education institutions without creating serious unintended
27

Remarks by the President on College Affordability, THE WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 22,
2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/22/remarks-president-collegeaffordability-buffalo-ny.
28
Kysie Miao, Performance-Based Funding of Higher Education: A Detailed Look at
Best Practices in 6 States, CTR. FOR AM. PROG. (Aug. 7, 2012), https://www.americanprogress.
org/article/performance-based-funding-of-higher-education/.
29
Lederman, et. al., supra note 3.

10

THE REGULATORY REVIEW IN DEPTH

[Vol. 5:1

consequences,” argued David Warren, director of the National Association
of Independent Colleges and Universities.30 Any rating system, he argued,
would reflect policymakers’ choices more than those of individual
students.
Although the Obama Administration claimed that the proposal would
distinguish among different types of schools, higher education leaders and
their lobbyists asserted that such a proposal would further exacerbate the
divide between the elite schools—where students from mostly wealthy
backgrounds graduate at high rates and secure well-paying employment—
from the many universities that provide open access and have lower
graduation and employment outcomes.31
“It’s not fair or reasonable really, to rate institutions on their performance
without consideration of the nature of their student body,” argued Peter
McPherson, president of the Association of Public and Land Grants
Universities.32
Higher education leaders also questioned the ability of the government
to gather and manage accurate data on these complicated factors. “Several
of the data points that the Department is likely to include in a rating system,
such as retention and graduation rates, default rates and earning data—are
flawed,” argued Molly Corbett Broad, President of the American Council
on Education.33 “The Department of Education’s retention and graduate
rates, for example, count as a dropout any student who transfers from one
institution to another, regardless of whether they complete their education
at another institution,” she continued.
Furthermore, according to critics, an exclusive focus on limited metrics,
such as earning data, could result in colleges neglecting programs in lowpaying occupations such as teaching and nursing.
During the summer of 2015, after more than two years of discussions
with higher education institutions, educational advocates and congressional
leaders, the Administration pivoted away from the idea of a creating a rating
system and then allocating federal funding based on performance according
to the ratings.34 As an alternative, the Administration is putting together a
database with “new, easy-to-use tools that will provide students with more
data than ever before to compare college costs and outcomes.” 35
Announcing this new plan, and signaling the Administration’s retreat
from a rating system, Education Deputy Undersecretary Jamienne Studley
acknowledged that meaningfully evaluating colleges “through a rating system
30

Id.
Michael Stratford, Staking Out Positions, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov. 21, 2013),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/11/21/higher-education-associations-stakeout-positions-ratings-system.
32
Id.
33
Molly Corbett Broad, Postsecondary Institution Ratings Response, AM. COUNCIL ON
EDUC. (Jan. 31, 2014), http://docplayer.net/3787060-January-31-2014-dear-mr-reeves.html.
34
Ellie Bothwell, Obama ‘Scraps' College Rating Plan, TIMES HIGHER EDUC. (June
25, 2015), https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/obama-scraps-college-rating-plan.
35
Fact Sheet, supra note 1.
31
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is an extremely complex and iterative process that appropriately takes time
and thoughtfulness.”36
The college rating saga has revealed the challenges to reforming the higher
education system using performance-based regulation. Even if everyone agrees
on general aspirations like accessibility, affordability, and quality, defining
those goals concretely and then applying them uniformly to the highly
heterogeneous world of higher education creates its own kind of problems.
IV. TOWARD A NEW APPROACH TO REGULATING HIGHER EDUCATION
All along, the Obama Administration’s proposed performance-based
system of funding for higher education had little chance of being adopted
in the current political climate. Congress’ 2015 budget threw this point into
sharp relief: it specifically prohibited the U.S. Department of Education
from collecting the data necessary for the implementation of a performance
rating system. Thus, although a performance-based framework is attractive
because it would push colleges and universities to focus more on student
outcomes, the debate over this system made clear the significant obstacles
to its implementation.
The challenges that the Education Department has been unable to
overcome are similar to those in other fields. The U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency’s (EPA) experience implementing the Clean Air Act is
instructive.37 Under the Clean Air Act, the regulator can articulate a
relatively clear goal—the reduction of pollution—and a fairly clear way to
measure progress toward that goal, namely emissions. Yet, the EPA’s air
quality and emissions standards have been debated and litigated for over a
decade, and to this day there is much disagreement over the proper way to
set these standards. And as we saw recently with the Volkswagen emissions
scandal, there also can be significant levels of cheating.38
Even if higher education institutions, advocates, and regulators could
agree on the right goals, defining them and measuring these standards pose
large obstacles, as the Obama Administration has found. Pursuing a
performance-based path toward regulating higher education would likely
result in several years of debate over the standards, followed by decades of
litigation once these standards would start to be applied.
Still, even with performance-based regulation being unlikely, the debate
over the appropriate means to regulate higher education will continue as
Congress considers the reauthorization of the Higher Education Act of 1965
(HEA).39 So what is the appropriate way to regulate higher education?
Although there is much disagreement over the answer to this question,
most policymakers agree that meaningful reform requires changes to the type
36

Id.
Clean Air Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7675.
38
Russell Hotten, Volkswagen: The Scandal Explained, BBC (Dec. 10, 2015), http://
www.bbc.com/news/business-34324772.
39
Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1161aa–1.
37
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of management-based regulation of higher education institutions. In other
sectors, the regulator is more deeply involved in framing the self-evaluation
process, and in assessing whether institutions have met their self-established
goals. A management-based regulatory scheme “with teeth” could create a
climate of greater productivity and transparency in higher education.
For instance, an improved management-based approach would facilitate
the achievement of certain widely agreed-upon aims. Policymakers,
advocates, and higher education leaders agree that the nation’s higher
education system should be affordable, provide access to a large segment of
the population, help students complete their degrees, and support student
achievement through quality programs that lead to employment. The
difficulties have stemmed from balancing these competing and conflicting
goals, defining how to meet them, and determining which, among many
alternatives, are the best paths to secure the goals. This is where a
management-based approach would be advantageous: it would acknowledge
the diversity of educational institutions, while still pushing these institutions
to make continuous improvement in the pursuit the goals.
Most policymakers have come to the conclusion that a managementbased approach is the only workable one, but almost everyone agrees that
there is room for improvement within the current accreditation structure.
The current system could lead to reform in two ways: through the
establishment of a more robust accreditation system that pushes institutions
to be more strategic in meeting the above-stated goals, and through a
revised regulatory system—either through accreditation or by other
mechanisms—that promotes innovation by allowing institutions to
experiment and that enables new higher education initiatives to gain access
to federal funding.
Higher education leaders have mostly responded to such ideas by
pushing back against “greater regulation” of the sector. They might be wise,
though, to take a more active role in shaping the scope and tenor of
regulation. Performance standards might not be the right approach, but a
more robust, management-based regime with greater agreement on the
aspects to be planned and evaluated might assist higher education
institutions in fighting a more invasive type of regulation, as well as provide
greater clarity on the goals these institutions should pursue.
For example, the reauthorized HEA could require each institution to
develop a plan that states its own specific goals for access and outcomes.
Institutions would then need to decide, and communicate, their goals for
students of color and economically disadvantaged students. Furthermore,
institutions would need to set goals for retention and graduation, and explain
the processes that they will implement to achieve these goals. Finally,
institutions would set their own goals for career placement and success.
Many institutions already take such steps in the reaccreditation process,
but a revised HEA could make doing so a requirement. It could also
mandate that the institutions publish their goals in a form that is easy to
understand, compile, and compare. The reauthorized HEA could establish
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a center within the Education Department that publishes a short and useful
explanation of each institution’s plan and a yearly update of its progress.
Higher education leaders might also use their willingness to
compromise on “accreditation with teeth” to leverage relief from some of
the many onerous regulatory burdens under which they currently operate.
Over the past few years, the federal government, through legislation,
regulation, and Department of Education practice, has significantly
increased oversight of the higher education sector. Federal regulators now
require significant reporting on many aspects of higher education practice,
particularly in the areas of financial compliance and student safety. In
essence, in an effort to improve the performance of the sector, Congress and
the Education Department have layered an inflexible, command-and-control
regulatory structure on top of the flexible if weak existing managementbased structure. This has created a system in which higher education
institutions are less than fully accountable for their primary function—
education—at the same time that they are highly regulated in many other
areas of their operation.
Educational leaders frequently complain that the specific processes that
the Department of Education mandates are burdensome, expensive, and not
focused on the most important aspects of their institutions. These critiques
are comprehensively described in a report issued this summer by the
bipartisan Task Force on Federal Regulation of Higher Education.40 The
report concludes that “many rules are unnecessarily voluminous and too
often ambiguous, and … the cost of compliance has become unreasonable. 41
Moreover, many regulations are unrelated to education, student safety, or
stewardship of federal funds. For example, accreditors must certify that
institutions are up-to-date with fire codes, an oversight responsibility that
really belongs with local government. Other Education Department rules
can be a barrier to college access and innovation in education.”
The report outlines numerous areas where federal regulation increases
university costs without, according to the task force, increasing productivity.
For instance, according to the task force, the Education Department has a
300- page book of guidelines for institutions about the Jeanne Clery Act,
the law that requires higher education institutions to report incidents of onand off-campus crime.42 This command-and-control regulation has detailed
and even contradictory guidelines for what institutions must report, and
which too often have the effect of inhibiting the communication of
important information and promoting the wasteful use of resources.
The report calls attention to the financial responsibility standards that
the Department of Education has implemented to ensure that institutions are
financially viable, which often lump colleges with significant resources into
the same category as those in financial peril. These standards, the Task
Force argues, do not represent best accounting practices, and are both over40
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inclusive and under-inclusive in identifying schools that necessitate
intervention. Further, the rules for determining financial aid eligibility
impose onerous requirements on potential aid recipients and institutions
alike; such requirements, the Task Force asserts, are disproportionate to the
risks of inaccurately allocating financial aid.
In all, the report provides a critical assessment of the increasing federal
regulatory reach, detailing the numerous ways in which higher education
institutions spend millions of dollars that could be better used. A reauthorized
HEA could streamline these procedures and provide clearer guidance to the
Department of Education.
Moreover, a fully thought-out management-based approach, with an
emphasis on institutional financial security and student outcomes, would
have the benefit of focusing colleges and universities on the most important
priorities. At the same time, eliminating some of the many other regulations
that are not directed at those two priorities would free up institutional
resources that could be refocused on helping students achieve and progress.
V. NEXT STEPS IN IMPROVING HIGHER EDUCATION REGULATION
The need for better regulation of higher education is clear. Critics of
command and control decry the wastefulness of box-checking and the many
other burdens imposed by prescriptive rules that are too often unrelated to
education. But the alternative of a creating an overarching performancebased regulatory rating system has also proven to be infeasible. Reforms are
clearly needed, and the best way to do so would be to strengthen the
management-based accreditation system.
The Obama Administration recently proposed legislative changes that
would move in this direction. In addition, to continue the pressure on the
accreditation system, the Department of Education has created a new
webpage to provide the public with more information about accrediting
bodies and the institutions they supervise.
Although the Department of Education is barred by legislation from
requiring accreditors to use specific educational outcomes to evaluate
colleges and universities, the Administration has published metrics for each
institution (including net tuition price, graduation rate, student loan default
rates, post-school earnings) on the department’s webpage that describes
their accrediting body.43 This action seeks to pressure accreditors to focus
more on these issues in the absence of direct authority. (The Administration
also urged Congress to reconsider its ban on agency directed outcomes
measures.)
The Administration has also taken steps to promote recent innovations
in higher education, announcing that it will allow a small number of colleges
and universities to partner with non-traditional educational institutions to
43
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create academic programs that can qualify for federal financial aid. This
experimental initiative seeks to increase enrollments in programs such as
short-term certificate programs, computer “boot camps,” MOOCs (massively
open online courses), and other personalized online educational programs
that provide training to students unconnected to a degree.
This new initiative will enable some students to secure Pell grants and
federal student loans to participate in these academic programs by involving
accredited institutions to partner with those running the programs. In the
past, few of these innovative programs have been able to secure
accreditation, and therefore students could not access aid. The partnerships
allowed under the initiative would enable students to obtain federal aid. As
a condition of participation in the initiative, schools would have to have the
innovative programs evaluated by an independent (accreditor-like) third
party for their effectiveness, and the partnerships would also have to meet
jointly established metrics for affordability, student learning, and postcompletion job attainment.
The Administration’s experimental initiative mirrors recent legislation
introduced by Senators Michael Bennett (D-CO) and Marco Rubio (R-FL)
that would create a separate procedure for institutions to access federal
financial aid.44 Instead of going through an accreditation process, innovative
new institutions that meet certain metrics for student achievement and job
placement could participate in federal student aid programs.
In essence, both the Administration and Senators Bennett and Rubio are
proposing an alternate, performance-based path for new models of higher
education. Instead of trying to change the whole industry, they focus on new
entrants into the field and arguing that we should regulate them differently.
Performance-based regulation for these new innovators, which are fewer in
number and where there is general agreement on what performance
measures should be adopted, seems to be a logical approach.
The next steps for improving higher education reform, it seems, will
not involve imposing a single regulatory approach on the entire industry.
In other words, the solution will not be as simple or easy as getting rid of
command and control and replacing it with a uniform performance rating
system. Rather, the future of higher education will depend on re-adjusting
and strengthening the existing approaches to regulating colleges and
universities.
A revitalized and strengthened accreditation system is needed, and such
a strengthened management-based system could be combined with a
lessening in certain unhelpful command-and-control burdens on institutions
of higher learning. And even though the Obama Administration’s
experience with its proposed college rating system makes clear that an
overall performance-based system is not feasible, recent initiatives and
legislative proposals suggest that performance evaluation can play a
meaningful role in assessing new, targeted innovations.
44
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In the end, just as with other areas of regulation, the federal government
needs to look carefully at all the policy tools available for improving access,
affordability, and quality in the higher education sector. The path forward
requires making smarter decisions about when, where, and how to use the
right tools.

